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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
COMMENTARY
Joel M. Gora*
One who reviews the Second Circuit's constitutional law
work product during any court term finds many of the usual
"suspects" on the docket: a number of criminal cases presenting
fourth amendment issues,1 a few right to counsel claims,2 some
procedural due process questions,3 certain interesting federal jurisdiction questions,4 some political corruption cases,5 and at
least two or three fascinating first amendment cases.' In this re* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 660 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1981) (use of "drug-sniffing" dog does not constitute a search); United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3963 (U.S. June 7, 1982) (No. 81-1617) (two-hour warrantless seizure of air passenger's luggage held to violate fourth amendment); United
States v. Moody, 649 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding routine warrantless customs
border search); United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980) (observation of
objects and activities inside a person's home by enhanced viewing through a telescope
constitutes a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment).
2 See, e.g., Camera v. Fogg, 658 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981) (multiple representation of
co-defendants violated sixth amendment right to counsel), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 981
(1981); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1981) (failure to appoint new counsel
during trial held not to constitute a sixth amendment violation).
3 See, e.g., Keeler v. Joy, 641 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1981) (procedures afforded tenant
prior to eviction complied with due process requirements), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 390
(1981); Baden v. Koch, 638 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1980) (dismissal of Chief Medical Examiner
does not constitute a due process violation if dismissal procedurally complied with local
regulations).
4 See, e.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
300 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding exercise of jurisdiction in suits for breach of contract
against foreign sovereigns), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1012 (1982); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981) (no jurisdiction to hear suits for breach
of contract against foreign sovereign when brought by foreign plaintiff), cert. granted,
102 S.Ct. 997 (1982). For a complete discussion of these two cases, see 48 BROoKLYN L.
REv. 979 (1982).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding indictment against United States Senator accused of "ABSCAM" charges); United States v.
Meyers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding indictment against Congressman accused
of "ABSCAM" charges), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).
4 See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d
430 (2d Cir. 1981) (religious group that practices ritual of Sankirtan cannot be confined
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spect, the 1980-1981 term was no exception and contained few
surprises.7 However, a perusal of the cases decided during this
term also discloses a more striking phenomenon: the term produced a large number of sui generis cases.8
These sui generis cases are particularly interesting both in
and of themselves, since most lawyers and certainly all law
teachers love cases that do not fit into any set mold, and with
respect to the Supreme Court's subsequent disposition of these
Second Circuit decisions. One comes away from these cases with
the sense that the Second Circuit, in its willingness to validate
novel constitutional claims, is frequently more expansive in its
rulings than the Supreme Court." To be sure, in several cases the
Second Circuit's disposition foreshadowed the Supreme Court's
ultimate rulings on the issue. 10 However, there remains a number of important instances in which the Second Circuit appeared
more willing than the Supreme Court to break new constitutional ground.1 1
I.
The proselytizing and solicitation activities of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) combine a
unique and powerful blend of free speech and free exercise
claims under the first amendment. 2 The ISKCON organization
has been extremely vigorous in asserting first amendment claims
in connection with its activities in places or in manners that government officials find impermissible. 3 In InternationalSociety

to "fixed booth" location at State Fair); Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free
School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980) (summary judgment denied in bookbanning case), afl'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
7 See notes 1-6 and accompanying text supra.
8 I include in that definition cases presenting novel legal issues or unusual factual
situations in a context where Supreme Court rulings provide little guidance for decision.
In such situations, a court is writing on a relatively blank slate, largely free from precedential restraints.
9 See notes 12-54 and accompanying text infra.
'o See notes 77-136 and accompanying text infra.
" See notes 55-76 and accompanying text infra.
12 U.S. CONsT. amend. L The first amendment provides that: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peacefully
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
13 E.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809
(5th Cir. 1979) (upholding requirement that religious solicitation at airport be conducted
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for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber,14 the ISKCON group,
pointing to its religious ritual of Sankirtan, which requires adherents to go into public places to distribute or sell religious
literature and solicit donations for its cause, attacked an antisolicitation regulation of the New York State Fair. The officials
of the fair had a "booth-only" rule, which limited solicitation
activities to fixed booth locations and prohibited any "roving"
solicitors.1 5 ISKCON filed suit, challenging the effect of this restriction on its practice of Sankirtan as an unreasonable interference with its free exercise of religion.1 6 Following an extensive
trial, a thoughtful district court judge upheld the rule as a valid
1
"time, place and manner" restriction on solicitation. 7
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by former Chief Judge
Kaufman, reversed the district court.18 Characteristically"9 beginning his opinion with an eloquent observation that
"[t]olerance of the unorthodox and unpopular is the bellwether
of a society's spiritual strength,"2 0 Judge Kaufman found, based
on an extensive record, that the ritual of Sankirtan, and the solicitation of funds it encompassed, was a "religious activity" entitled to free exercise clause protection2 1 unless the state could
show a compelling justification "of the highest order" for the restriction.2 2 Finding the "booth-only" rule a "total limitation on
the free exercise of a [S]ankirtan,"2' 3 the court then examined
the justifications offered by the state. Judge Kaufman agreed
that the state's goal-the prevention of fraud and harassment by
ISKCON solicitators-was a compelling interest and that the

only in designated booths).
14650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981).
,6Id. at 434 n.3.
16Id. at 438.
" See 506 F. Supp. 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
18 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981).
See, e.g., Federal Election Comm. v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678
F.2d 416, 419 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The principle of free expression requires that all groups
remain unfettered when expounding their ideologies, regardless of how universally disfavored those opinions may be.").
,0650 F.2d at 432.
" Id. at 443.
11 Id. at 444. The standard adopted by the Second Circuit, demanding a state justification "of the highest order," was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
23 650 F.2d at 443.
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rule was "well-tailored" to achieve that purpose.24 The rule
failed, however, because the state was unable to show that no
less restrictive alternatives were available. More particularly, the
court concluded that the direct policing of specific acts of fraud
and harassment was preferable to the prior restraint inherent in
the "booth-only" rule.25
Less than three weeks after the Second Circuit's decision in
Barber, the Supreme Court, in effect, reversed the Second Circuit. In Heffron v. InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,25 the Supreme Court addressed issues identical to
those presented in Barber and upheld the "booth-only" rule.
Unlike the Second Circuit opinion, which elaborately demonstrated the religious nature of the Sankirtan practice in order to
trigger the rigorous compelling interest/least restrictive alternative analysis,27 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the booth restriction was "reasonable" in terms of time,
place and manner, and found the "booth-only" rule justifiable
under that less demanding, more deferential standard.2 8 Indeed,
the Court, in the face of a record stipulation that Sankirtan is a
religious ritual,29 specifically rejected the argument that
the inclusion of peripatetic solicitation as part of a church ritual entitles church members to solicitation rights in a public forum superior
to those of members of other religious groups that raise money but do
not purport to ritualize the process. Nor ... do religious organizations enjoy rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit on the fair
grounds superior to those of other organizations having social, political, or other ideological messages to proselytize."0

The dissent, agreeing with the Second Circuit's position in

Id. at 445.
21Id. at 447.
26 452 U.S. 640 (1981). Heffron involved the Minnesota State Fair and ISKCON
efforts to challenge a "fixed location" rule applicable to solicitation and the distribution
of literature. Apparently, there was no certiorari petition to seek review of the Second
Circuit ruling in Barber.Given the ruling in Heffron, there was obviously no need to seek
Supreme Court review.
27 See notes 21-25 and accompanying text supra.
28 452 U.S. at 654. The court stated: "we hold that the State's interest in confining
distribution, selling and fund solicitation activities to fixed locations is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a place or manner restriction must serve a substantial state
interest." Id. at 654.
29 Id. at 659 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 652.
24
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Barber, believed that less drastic, more narrowly drawn restrictions were available to achieve the state's legitimate concerns.3 '
A similar sequence can be found in two other related Second Circuit/Supreme Court cases dealing with the first amendment's speech and religion clauses. 32 In Brandon v. Board of Education,33 the Second Circuit, again with Judge Kaufman
writing the opinion, held that a public high school's refusal to
allow a student religious group to use school facilities for a preschool prayer meeting not only did not violate the students' free
exercise and free speech rights, but that such a refusal was man34
dated by the first amendment's establishment clause.
One year after Brandon, the Supreme Court, affirming an
Eighth Circuit decision, reached an opposite result in Widmar v.
Vincent.35 In Widmar, a group of college students wished to use
a public university facility for religious worship and discussion.
The university refused the students' request and the Eighth Circuit held that the university's regulation constituted contentbased discrimination against religious speech, that no compelling
justification was available, and that the establishment clause did
not bar a policy of equal access.3 6 Viewing the case primarily as
a free speech, public forum issue, the Supreme Court ruled that
the university's prohibition interfered with the students' free
speech rights and that the establishment clause would not be
violated by allowing a group equal access to a university-created
7
3
public forum.

Both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court purported
to distinguish the principles enunciated in the opposing circuit
courts' opinions. The Second Circuit, in distinguishing the
Eighth Circuit ruling permitting the religious activity, pointed to
the differences between the high school and college setting, reasoning that high school students were better able to exercise religious freedom off-campus than college students and, conversely, were more vulnerable to the establishment dangers of
SI Id. at 659.

1, See note 12 supra.
33 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981).
11 Id. at 979. See note 12 supra.
35 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
34 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980).
31 102 S. Ct. at 273.
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on-campus activities. 8 In Widmar, the Supreme Court distinguished Brandon on this latter ground, but also stated that the
facilities in Brandon had not been made available to other student groups and thus, no "public forum" had been created.3 9 A
careful reading of Brandon, however, indicates that the student
plaintiffs did claim that other student groups had been allowed
to use the facilities for meetings. In other words, a "public forum" claim had been made and the Second Circuit had rejected
it when it noted that "other organizations are permitted to use
school facilities, but their use does not raise serious problems of
the establishment of religion. Moreover, since all religious
groups are equally denied access to school facilities, any equal
protection argument lacks merit."'4 0
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Brandon directly conflicts
with the ultimate analysis of the Supreme Court in Widmar.
Therefore, the Second Circuit's attempt to safeguard the delicate principles of the separation of church and state was effectively undercut by the Supreme Court.
Turning from Second Circuit decisions concerning the first
amendment to decisions involving the eighth amendment, 1 one
finds another example of the Second Circuit being, at least
slightly, ahead of the Supreme Court. In Lareau v. Manson, 2
the Second Circuit considered a prisoners' suit challenging the
overcrowded conditions at the Hartford Community Correctional Center in Connecticut. In the context of a broad and systematic remedial order, designed to alleviate this gross overcrowding, the district court prohibited the "double-bunking" of
inmates.'3 The Second Circuit, although modifying the order to
prohibit the "double-bunking" of a pre-trial detainee for more
than 15 days 44 and a sentenced prisoner for more that 30 days,"4
basically ruled that beyond those time periods, the use of

38 635 F.2d at 977.
31
40
41

102 S. Ct. at 276 n.13.
635 F.2d at 980.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment provides that- "Excessive bail

shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." Id.
42 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
43 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980).
44 651 F.2d at 105.
16 Id. at 109.
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"double-bunking" was impermissible. 46
The court reached this result despite a recent Supreme
Court ruling in Bell v. Wolfish,47 in which Justice Rehnquist
stated that there is no "one man, one cell principle lurking in
the Due Process Clause .... Moreover, in Lareau, the Second
Circuit entered its decision restricting "double-bunking" knowing that the Supreme Court was about to hand down its first
eighth amendment ruling on that issue. Indeed, Judge Friendly,
dissenting on that point alone,4 9 urged the panel to withhold its
decision until the Supreme Court's ruling.5 0
Two weeks after the Second Circuit's decision, the Supreme
Court, in Rhodes v. Chapman,51 ruled, eight to one, that the
"double-ceiling" of inmates did not constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.5 2 Admittedly, the Supreme Court indicated that the constitutional
validity of "double-ceiling" could not be considered in isolation
from the general conditions at the particular facility.5 3 Nevertheless, the general conditions at the Connecticut facility did not
appear so much worse than the conditions at the Ohio facility
considered by the Supreme Court in Rhodes, so as to justify the
difference in results. 54 Rather, once again, the Second Circuit
took a more expansive view of constitutional rights than the Supreme Court.
In the three decisions just discussed, the Second Circuit's
approach was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases. The next two cases discussed, both involving the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants in unusual settings,
resulted in direct Supreme Court reversals of the Second Circuit
rulings.
Rivera v. Harris55 involved what Judge Newman character-

" See 651 F.2d 96.
4- 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In Bell, the Supreme Court reversed another Second Circuit
prisoner rights ruling. Id.
" Id. at 542.
4, 651 F.2d at 111-16 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 115-16.
51 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
52 Id.

Id. at 352.
Descriptions of the facilities in question in Rhodes and in Lareau can be found at
452 U.S. 336, 339-44 (1981) and 651 F.2d 96, 98-101 (2d Cir. 1981), respectively.
" 643 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), rev'd sub nom., Harris v. Rivera, 102 S. Ct. 460 (1981) (per
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ized as "interesting issues concerning the constitutionality of inconsistent verdicts rendered by a judge in a multi-defendant
criminal trial without a reasoned explanation of the basis for the
disparate results." ' The rather complicated facts of the case involved the sharply conflicting testimony of the complainant and
one of the co-defendants. The state trial judge acquitted the testifying defendant on certain charges, but convicted the other defendants. 7 On federal habeas corpus review, Judge Newman's
careful opinion detailed the trial testimony, pointed to the settled Second Circuit rule against "irrationally inconsistent" verdicts in federal criminal bench trials,5 8 and concluded that there
was no rational basis upon which to square the petitioner's conviction with the co-defendant's acquittal.5 9 Finally, the court addressed the novel question of whether such unexplained inconsistency rises to a constitutional due process violation. Drawing
on a wide variety of constitutional and procedural sources, the
court concluded that, at least with respect to facially inconsistent judgments in non-jury cases, due process of law requires an
explanation for the discrepancy in result so as to minimize error
and to reduce arbitrariness.60
In a per curiam opinion, without full briefing or argument,
and with only Justice Marshall dissenting, the Supreme Court
reversed. 61 The brief opinion criticized the Second Circuit's interpretation of its own "settled rule" against irrationally inconsistent verdicts in federal criminal cases, and lectured the court
on the permissible scope of federal habeas courpus review.2 The
court tersely held that the Second Circuit had "plainly erred," 3
stating that:
there is no federal requirement that a State trial judge explain his
reasons for acquitting a defendant in a state criminal trial; even if the
acquittal rests on an improper ground, that error would not create a
constitutional defect in a guilty verdict that is supported by sufficient

curiam).
6 643 F.2d at 87.
57

Id.

58 Id. at 90-91 (citing United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960)).
59 Id. at 97.
60 Id. at 96.
61 102 S. Ct.
62

63

460 (1981).
Id. at 462-66.
Id. at 463.
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evidence and is the product of a fair trial.'

The Supreme Court was "not persuaded that an apparent
inconsistency in a trial judge's verdict gives rise to an inference
of irregularity in his finding of guilt that is sufficiently strong to
overcome the well-established presumption that the judge adhered to basic rules of procedure. '6 5 The Court then speculated
on the various possible explanations for the inconsistency and
found them all constitutionally tolerable.6 In so ruling, the Supreme Court gave embarrassingly short shrift to the due process
ruling that Judge Newman had so painstakingly fashioned.
6 7 the SuIn the other due process case, Smith v. Phillips,
preme Court, while giving somewhat more respectful attention
to the Second Circuit's opinion than it had in Rivera, again reversed. In Smith, the issue was whether the state court murder
conviction of a former New York City police officer was tainted
by the fact, known only to the prosecution, that during the trial
one of the jurors had been actively seeking employment in the
prosecutor's office. 6 8 The district court, relying on venerable precedent requiring impartiality by judges,6 9 found a due process
violation. 0
The Second Circuit affirmed, relying on a different rationale: namely, that the prosecution's failure to disclose this information during the trial denied the defendant "fair treatment"
and thereby violated due process considerations. In reaching this
result, the court relied on cases forbidding the knowing use of
perjured testimony and the wrongful withholding of exculpatory
evidence. 1 The court concluded: "To condone the withholding
Id.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 465-66.
• 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982), rev'g Phillips v. Smith, 632 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1980). For
extensive discussions of Phillips,see 48 BROOKLYN L. REv. 901 & 1147 (1982).
632 F.2d at 1020-22.
' See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (practice of remunerating inferior
judicial officers only when the defendant is convicted provides the judge with a direct,
personal, substantive, pecuniary interest in holding against the defendant, and therefore,
violates due process).
'6

70

632 F.2d at 1022.

7' See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution's failure to produce
evidence requested by defendant violated due process where the evidence was material
to guilt or punishment regardless of whether the prosecution acted in good faith); Napue
v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecution's failure to correct testimony he knew to be
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by the prosecutor of information casting substantial doubt as to
the impartiality of a juror. . . would not be fair to a defendant
and would ill serve to maintain public confidence in the integrity
7' 2
of the judicial process.
The Supreme Court reversed.7 3 On the impartiality claim,
Justice Rehnquist ruled that actual bias could not be implied or
imputed to the juror and had not been proven in the state court
hearings after the trial. Accordingly, the opinion stated that
"due process does not require a new trial everytime a juror has
been placed in a potentially compromising situation."' 74 With respect to the prosecutorial nondisclosure, the Supreme Court
faulted the Second Circuit's reading of the relevant case law,
stating that "the touchstone of due proces analysis in cases of
alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not
the culpability of the prosecutor. ' 75 Although not "condon[ing]
the conduct of the prosecutors," the Court concluded that because the juror's job search did not impair his ability to render
an impartial verdict, the prosecutor's failure to disclose that information did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 78
II.
Lest it be thought that the Second Circuit is dominated by
card-carrying civil libertarians, it should be noted, of course,
that in a number of cases presenting novel constitutional issues
the court's treatment of those questions has foreshadowed and
anticipated the resolution of those same issues by the Supreme
Court. Several cases decided during the 1980-1981 Second Circuit term are illustrative.
In recent years, many communities, alarmed at the increase
of drug use by young people, passed so-called "head-shop" laws
designed to regulate stores that sold "drug paraphernalia." Typically, those ordinances defined drug paraphernalia as items

false violated due process). See generally United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
(there is no constitutional violation where there is no knowing use of perjured testimony,
no specific request for the evidence, and the evidence omitted by the prosecution was not
so material as to have created a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist).
72 632 F.2d at 1023.
73 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
74 Id. at 946.
75
76

Id. at 947.
Id. at 948.
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"designed," "marketed," or "intended" for use with proscribed
drugs." Obviously, since the items themselves, such as small
pipes, rolling paper and tiny spoons, were not illegal, the applicability of the regulations turned on the meaning of terms such
as "designed for use with" and posed considerable vagueness
78

problems.
One such ordinance,7 9 enacted in Westchester County, New

York, was before the Second Circuit in Brache v. County of
Westchester."0 The provision made it a misdemeanor to sell
drug paraphernalia, and local merchants, whose stores sold
"smoking accessories," filed suit contending that the definition
of drug paraphernalia was unconstitutionally vague.81 Although
the storeowners conceded that the ordinance could validly be
applied to "single-use" items (i.e., items whose only use was in
connection with illegal drugs), the district court ruled that they
could still challenge the facial validity of the ordinance because
of its potential application to "multi-use" items.8 2 Since the ordinance failed to give sufficient notice as to which multi-use
items were proscribed, the district court held that it was unconstitutionally vague.83
The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that "[a] statute is
unconstitutionally vague on its face only when it cannot be applied to any conduct.

'84

Conversely, the court stated, "if a stat-

ute has a core meaning that can reasonably be understood, then
See note 78 infra.
78 Such ordinances have been challenged as impermissibly vague in violation of the
due process clause. See, e.g., Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1981)
(vagueness challenge denied); The Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551 (8th Cir. 1981)
(vagueness challenge denied); High 01' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.
1980) (vagueness challenge upheld); Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980)
(vagueness challenge upheld).
71 The ordinance provided, in pertinent part, that it shall constitute a misdemeanor
for "any merchant or other person to knowingly sell, offer for sale, or display any cocaine
spoon, marijuana pipe, hashish pipe, or any other drug-related paraphernalia." Brache v.
County of Westchester, 658 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1981). The ordinance defines "drug paraphernalia" as "all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, in7

tended for use, or desi[gn]ed for use in ...

growing ...

preparing, testing ....

[or]

ingesting... a controlled substance," including, but not limited to, more than a dozen
specified items ranging from drug test kits to "ice pipes or chillers." Id.
80 658 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1643 (1982).
s1 Id. at 49. See note 79 supra.
s2 507 F. Supp. 566, 574-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
s2Id. at 581.
" 658 F.2d at 50.
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it may validly be applied to conduct within the core meaning,
and the possibility of such a valid application necessarily means
that the statute is not vague on its face. '8 5 Moreover, under
traditional standing rules, 88 one to whom a statute may validly
be applied may not challenge the possible vagueness of its application to third parties.87 The Second Circuit held that this principle could be extended to deny vagueness "standing" to a challenger who engages in some core activity but who also engages in
other kinds of activity as to which the regulation is arguably
vague. 8 In effect, the plaintiffs were thereby denied standing to
challenge the vagueness of the statute as applied to some of
their very own activities. This curious result was justified on the
additional federalism ground that until the ordinance was enforced, it could not be ascertained whether it would be applied
to "single-use" items, which would be a permissible application
of the ordinance, or "multiple-use" items, which would be a
questionable application. 9
Several months later, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous
decision, basically validated this approach. In Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,90 the Court rejected a vagueness attack on a similar "head-shop" ordinance.
In another area, a Second Circuit decision also paralleled a
subsequent Supreme Court ruling on a related issue. In
Signorelli v. Evans,9 1 a New York State judge, wishing to run for
Congress, challenged the constitutionality of an article of the
New York State Constitution 9 2 and other restrictions" that re-

85 Id.at 51.
88 See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). In Raines, the Supreme
Court established the standing rule that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also
be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
be unconstitutional." Id. at 21.
87 United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93 (1975); United States v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100-02
(1951).
88 658 F.2d at 52-53.

89Id.
90 102 S.Ct. 1186 (1982).
91637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980).
92 N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 20(b). This provision essentially provides that upon nomination to any public office (other than a judgeship), a judge must resign from his
position.
"3See RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 22 NYCRR § 33.7 (which prohibits a
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quire a judge to resign from judicial office in order to be a candidate for election to any non-judicial office. The plaintiff claimed
that the prohibitions violated the Qualifications Clause of the
United States Constitution,94 which sets forth three requirements to be a member of Congress,95 by adding the additional
requirement of not being a judge.96 The Second Circuit rejected
this contention, holding that the restrictions were a valid state
regulation of state judicial officers. 7 The court drew support for
this conclusion from the policy embodied in the Incompatibility
Clauses of the United States Constitution.9 The Second Circuit
stated: "By requiring state judges to resign from their positions
if they seek election to Congress, New York adopts its own incompatibility principle, protecting the integrity and independence of the judicial branch from the conflicting activities of
seeking and holding Congressional office."' 00
101 considered a
The Supreme Court, in Clements v. Fashing,

state judge from participation in a political campaign except a campaign for reelection);
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(3) (1977) (which requires a judge to resign from
his office upon becoming a candidate for a non-judicial position).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
" The qualifications clause provides that: "No person shall be a Representative who
shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years and have been a Citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which
he shall be chosen." Id.
" 637 F.2d at 856.
Id. at 862-63.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. The incompatibility clause provides that: "no person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during his
Continuance in Office." Id.
" 637 F.2d at 859-62. The Second Circuit examined the framers' debates concerning
their consideration of the scope of congressional members' ineligibility for appointive
office and concluded that "it was clear that all sides accepted the principle of incompatability- no one should be allowed to hold Congressional and other federal office at the
same time." Id. at 860. The court found that the policy underlying the adoption of the
Incompatability Clause was "to secure the principle of separation of powers and reduce
an opportunity for undue influence by the Executive Branch upon Congress." Id. at 861
(citing THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 459 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("The [Incompatability Clause of the] Constitution has provided some important guards against
the danger of executive influence upon the legislative body."). The court determined that
the framers did not intend the Incompatability Clause to be exclusive of additional state
remedies, 637 F.2d at 862, and concluded that "New York can properly disqualify its
judges from holding other offices, paralleling the federal structure, and not offend the
Qualifications Clause because the analogous constitutional provision, the Incompatibility
Clause, was not intended to preempt similar state regulation." Id.
100 Id. at 861.
101 102 S. Ct. 2836 (1982).
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similar provision in the Texas Constitution, requiring that
judges resign from their office in order to run for the state legislature. Since, unlike the situation in Signorelli, the Texas provision did not affect candidates for the United States Congress, no
2
qualifications clause argument was available to the challenger.l1
Instead, the plaintiff claimed that the statutory classifications of
the provision, barring some officials but not others from running
for the legislature, deprived him of equal protection with respect
to access to the ballot. 0 3 A closely divided Supreme Court rejected the claim, reasoning, as had the Second Circuit in
Signorelli, that the state's interest in regulating the conduct of
judges was sufficient to sustain the restriction. 10
The Supreme Court also upheld the Second Circuit in Blum
v. Bacon, 0 5 a welfare regulation case, but did so on grounds that
had been rejected by the court of appeals. The case involved a
challenge, brought by recipients of benefits under New York's
Aid to Families with Dependent Children programs (AFDC), to
a 1977 state statute which excluded AFDC recipients from eligibility for certain kinds of emergency assistance.1 06 The state
emergency assistance program receives substantial federal funding under the Social Security Act. 10 7 The challengers claimed
that the restrictions were inconsistent with the federal funding
statutes and thus, violative of the supremacy clause, 0 8 and, alternatively, that the classifications embodied in the state statute
had no rational basis and consequently violated the equal protection clause.' 0 9
The Second Circuit rejected the former argument, but accepted the latter." 0 Relying on a 1978 Supreme Court decision,"' the court found that Congress intended the states to
have substantial flexibility in determining the scope of emergency assistance programs, and that the exclusion of AFDC re-

102Id. at 2842.
103 Id.
10"Id. at 2846.
105 102 S. Ct. 2355 (1982), aff'g Bacon v. Toia, 648 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1981).
108 N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 350 (McKinney 1981 Supp.).
10 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(5) (1976).
'08 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
109 648 F.2d at 803-04.
110 Id. at 803.
"I Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978).
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cipients was not inconsistent with congressional intent.11 2 The
court found that the exclusions did, however, violate equal protection principles because the state could supply no basis for
purjustifying the disparate treatment for emergency assistance
1 13
recipients.
welfare
of
poses of different categories
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, but it did so on
the basis of the supremacy clause argument that the Second Circuit had rejected.114 The Court relied heavily on implementing
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, which disapproved of provisions like New
York's. 5 The Second Circuit had viewed those regulations as
beyond the scope of federal statutes, " 6 but the Supreme Court
disagreed, holding the New York exclusions inconsistent with
those federal regulations and thus invalid under the supremacy
clause.1 17 Accordingly, there was no need to address the Second
Circuit's equal protection ruling.
The final case in this group is probably the most well-known
decision of the Second Circuit's 1980-1981 term: Pico v. Board of
Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No.
26 1 18-the "book-banning" case. In terms of governing Supreme
Court precedent, the issues were clearly of "first impression."
Circuit was deeply and sharply diConsequently, the Second
11 9
vided on its resolution.
In 1976, following pressure from parents, a number of books
were ordered removed from the library shelves in the Island
Trees, New York school district. The books were characterized
by school board officials as "anti-American, anti-Christian, antiSemitic, and just plain filthy.1120 The plaintiffs, a group of students, as well as others, filed suit challenging the removal on
first amendment grounds. The district court granted summary
judgment for the school officials, finding that the school board's
motives were not censorial but, rather, were based on "its belief

11

648 F.2d at 804-06.
Id. at 809.

11

102 S. Ct. 2355, 2357 (1982).

112

"' Id. at 2359-64.

648 F.2d at 807-08.
S. Ct. at 2360-64.
11 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). The Island Trees case
is extensively discussed elsewhere in this issue, see 48 BROoKLYN L. REv. 869 (1982).
"I See notes 122-36 and accompanying text infra.
12

11,102

,fi 102 S. Ct. at 2803.
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that the nine books removed . . . were irrelevant, vulgar, im-

moral, and in bad taste, making them educationally unsuitable
'
for the district's junior and senior high school students."121
A panel of the Second Circuit reversed, but the three
Judges each filed a separate opinion.'22 District Judge Sifton,
sitting by designation, found that, notwithstanding the broad
deference required to be afforded to school officials in the daily
operation of schools, a different approach was required when, as
here, a "prima facie First Amendment violation" was evidenced
in the "irregular and apparently arbitrary intervention in the
daily operation of secondary school affairs .... I"'s In such a

case, the school officials must carry the burden of establishing
that their actions did not violate the first amendment. Judge
Sifton concluded that, in the instant case, they had failed to do
124
so and that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment.
On the other hand, Judge Mansfield, vigorously dissenting
and relying on an "indistinguishable" earlier Second Circuit ruling,

25

charged that a reversal was "an unwarranted interfer-

ence" with the rational exercise by school board officials of their
26
duty to prescribe appropriate materials.

The dispositive vote came from Judge Newman. While
Judge Sifton thought the record was sufficient to find a prima
facie first amendment violation, 27 Judge Newman's opinion focused on the need for a trial probing the school officials' motivations before it could be decided that such a violation had occurred. 28 Accordingly, the final disposition by the Second
Circuit was to reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendants and to require that the matter go
121

Id. at 2804.

122 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980).
123
124

Id. at 415.
Id. at 418-19.

125 President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) (finding no basis for federal court scrutiny of
school officials' library decision).
126 638 F.2d at 419. Judge Mansfield concluded that it was within the discretion of
the school board to remove books containing "indecent matters, vulgarities, profanities,
explicit sexual descriptions or allusions, sexual perversions, or disparaging remarks about
Blacks, Jews and Christ. . ." Id.
217
See text accompanying note 123 supra.
128 638 F.2d at 432.
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to trial. 129 On the petition for rehearing en banc, the Second Circuit could not possibly have been more closely divided: a rehearing was denied by a vote of five to five. 3 0
The Supreme Court affirmed, but it was as deeply divided
on the issue as the Second Circuit had been. 131 Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens and
partly by Justice Blackmun, took the same approach that had
linked Judges Newman and Sifton:
[W]hether petitioners' removal of books from their school libraries denied respondents their First Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behind petitioners' actions. If petitioners intended by their
removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, .

.

. then petitioners have exercised their discretion

in violation of the Constitution.... On the other hand,. . . an unconstitutional motivation would not be demonstrated if it were shown
that petitioners had decided to remove the books at issue because
those books were pervasively vulgar ....[or] if it were demonstrated
that the removal decision was based solely upon the "educational suitability" of the books
in question, then their removal would be "per11 1
fectly permissible. 2

Accordingly, the plurality concluded that a trial was required to
probe those issues.
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and
O'Connor, all filed dissents which, in one fashion or another,
tracked the approach of Judge Mansfield's dissenting opinion in
the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court dissenters expressed the
same concern that the dissent in the Second Circuit had voiced:
namely, that the ruling would invite intrusion into school board
decisions. 1 33 The dissenters also questioned whether any prior
first amendment holdings required such a result. 13 '
Finally, Justice White provided the crucial "swing" vote for
affirmance, much as Judge Newman had at the circuit level;13 5
Justice White's vote was narrow indeed:
The unresolved factual issue, as I understand it, is the reason or rea-

12

Id. at 419.

646 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1981).
" 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
"32 Id. at 2810.
133 Id. at 2819-22, 2829-30, 2835.
134Id. at 2817-35.
135 See text accompanying notes 127-29 supra.
130
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sons underlying the school board's removal of the books. I am not inclined to disagree with the Court of Appeals on such a fact-bound
issue and hence concur in the judgment of affirmance. Presumably
this will result in a trial and the making of a full record and findings
on the critical issues.
The Court seems compelled to go further and issue a dissertation
on the extent to which the First Amendment limits the discretion of
the school board to remove books 13from
the school library. I see no
6
necessity for doing so at this point.
CONCLUSION

The Island Trees case is an appropriate place to conclude
this commentary, for it reflects the tensions inherent in the role
of an intermediate appellate court like the Second Circuit. A
case like Island Trees has always been a difficult one in terms of
finding a persuasive and acceptable first amendment theory for
challenging the school board's actions, which is also sufficiently
discrete and limited so that its adoption would not open the
door to federal court scrutiny of every curricular, textbook or
library decision made by a local school board. Faced with a case
like that, an appellate court must reconcile the conflict between
its responsibility to apply settled Supreme Court doctrine and
its obligation, where binding precedent is not to the contrary, to
reach out and fashion new constitutional protection. A court
that takes the narrower view of its responsibilities decides a case
like Island Trees in a cautious fashion. A court with a more robust sense of its role in constitutional adjudication approaches
such a case in a more ambitious manner. Obviously, in Island
Trees, the tension between these conflicting judicial instincts
was profound.
This same tension is present in the other constitutional law
rulings that highlight the Second Circuit's 1980-1981 term. In
some cases, the court took the more cautious approach and had
its views vindicated by a similarly restrained Supreme Court. In
other instances, the Second Circuit strived to fashion new constitutional rights, only to have its work rejected by the Supreme
Court. The lesson that a prudent court might learn from these
observations would be to avoid the risk-taking associated with

136

102 S. Ct. at 2816.
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these latter cases. One would hope, however, that the Second
Circuit would continue, on occasion, to opt for the bolder course.

